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INTRODUCTION 
Many local historic preservation statutes are characterized by economic hardship 
provisions in the permit review process that allow municipalities to avoid compensation 
liability under the Takings Clause.1  New York City, for example, has provided that a 
certificate of appropriateness can be granted if the applicant demonstrates that she cannot 
earn a statutorily set "reasonable rate of return" on the property in its present state.2  Some 
cities, including the District of Columbia, have drafted their preservation laws in a manner 
that specifically incorporates the federal constitutional standard for a taking, in order to 
fully understand the operation of the economic hardship provision of the DC Historic 
District and Historic Landmark Protection Act, it is necessary to have a working knowledge 
of constitutional takings jurisprudence. 
Although many local historic preservation laws have economic hardship provisions, 
the District of Columbia is unique in providing a separate economic hardship standard for 
low-income property owners. This provision provides a heightened level of protection for 
property owned by low-income individuals. This paper will discuss the original purposes 
of the provision, the benefits of a separate standard for low-income individuals, and the 
potential for the provision's abuse by unscrupulous developers. Although the intentions 
underlying the creation of the provision were quite laudable, the 
1 See, e.g., San Antonio Historic Preservation Ordinance, SAN ANTONIO MUN. § 35-7002 (2003) (defining 
unreasonable economic hardship as "an economic burden imposed upon the owner which is unduly excessive 
and prevents a realization of a reasonable rate of return on the value of his property as an investment, 
applying the test utilized by the Supreme Court of Texas in construing Article I, Section 17 of the 
Constitution of the State of Texas, 1876, in determining the existence of an unreasonable economic 
hardship."); Lake Forest [Illinois] Historic Residential Historic Preservation Ordinance, LAKE FOREST CITY 
CODE § 51-6 (2003) (providing for a certificate of economic hardship when denial of a permit results in 
"denial of all reasonable use of and return from the property."). 
2 NYC CODE § 25-309 (2002). The statute defines a reasonable rate of return as a "net annual return of six per 
centum of the valuation of an improvement parcel." Id. at § 25-302(v). 
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benefits of the low-income standard, as it is presently administered, are more than 
outweighed by its potential costs. This paper will conclude by examining the safeguards 
that are available to prevent such abuse. 
REGULATORY TAKINGS AND UNREASONABLE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP IN THE DC LAW 
The District of Columbia Historic District and Historic Landmark Protection Act 
In 1978, the DC Council enacted the Historic District and Historic Landmark 
Protection Act.3  In addition to establishing procedures for the designation of historic 
districts and individual landmarks, the Act also provided a detailed statutory framework for 
reviewing demolitions, alterations, subdivisions, and new construction within historic 
districts and on landmark properties.4  Under the Act, any application to demolish a 
landmark property or a contributing structure within an historic district is subject to review 
by the DC Historic Preservation Review Board (HPRB).5  If it finds that the proposed 
demolition or alteration is "compatible" with the purposes of the Act, the HPRB 
recommends approval of the permit application to the Mayor's Agent.6  If, however, the 
Board determines that the proposed work will be incompatible with the landmark or the 
character of the historic district, it recommends denial of the permit. 
Section 6-1104 of the DC Law provides that no demolition "permit shall be issued 
unless the Mayor finds that issuance of the permit is necessary in the public interest, or that 
failure to issue a permit will result in an unreasonable economic hardship to the 
3 Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act, B.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1101, et seq. (2003). 
4 Id. at §§ 6-1104 (demolition), 6-1105 (alteration), 6-1106 (subdivision), and 6-1107 (new construction). 
5 Id. at §6-1104. 
6 Id. at § 6-1103. The Mayor's authority under the DC Law has been delegated to the Mayor's Agent, an 
administrative law judge. 
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owner."7  Section 6-1102 of the Act defines "necessary in the public interest" as either: 1) 
consistent with the purposes of the Act; or 2) necessary to construct a project of special 
merit.8  Section 6-1102 of the Act also provides that a property owner experiences 
unreasonable economic hardship when "failure to issue a permit would amount to a taking 
of the owner's property without just compensation."9   Additionally, "low-income owners" 
suffer unreasonable economic hardship if a permit denial imposes an "onerous and 
excessive financial burden" upon them.10
This test was clearly designed to avoid compensation liability under the Takings 
Clause. Councilmember John Wilson introduced Bill 2-367 in the DC Council on June 
28,1978.11  As originally introduced, the bill provided that the Mayor could issue a 
demolition permit if a denial would impose an "undue economic hardship" upon the 
applicant.12  The bill defined undue economic hardship as a condition in which "the owner's 
return from and use of the property are unreasonably limited without the fault of the 
owner."13  Two days before the bill was introduced, the Supreme Court handed down its 
landmark decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, which upheld 
the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law against facial and as-applied takings 
challenges.14  When the amended bill emerged from the Committee on Housing and Urban 
Development in September, the provision had been modified to incorporate 
7 Id. at §6-1104. 
8 Id. at § 6-1102. "Special merit" is defined as "a plan or a building having significant benefits to the District 
of Columbia or to the community by virtue of exemplary architecture, specific features of land planning, or 
social or other benefits having a high priority for community services." Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 COMMITTEE ON HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, COUNCIL OF D.C., REPORT ON BILL 2-367,1 (Oct. 5, 1978) [hereinafter 
COMMITTEE  REPORT].  
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the constitutional takings standard established in Penn Central)5  By adopting the federal 
regulatory takings standard in designing the provision, the DC Council insured that the 
denial of a demolition permit would almost never result in a taking of private property 
requiring compensation. It is important to note, however, that this provision merely 
provided a statutory standard for permit review. Whether the denial of a demolition permit 
effects an unconstitutional regulatory taking, on the other hand, is determined by federal 
constitutional law. It is this federal standard that provides content to the economic hardship 
provision of the DC Law. The DC Council emphasized this point, noting that because the 
statutory definition "is designed to embody the constitutional standard as defined by the 
United States Supreme Court, the precise legal boundaries of this definition may change 
from time to time as the Court defines a taking for these purposes."16  This distinction, as 
explained below, has a number of important practical implications for litigation purposes. 
Regulatory Takings and Historic Preservation 
14 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
15 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11 at 6. In addition to citing Penn Central, the Committee's report also 
refers to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Maker v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975). The 
Committee noted that an applicant claiming economic hardship must demonstrate that:  
(i)   He cannot continue to use the property; and  
(ii) He cannot sell the property for an amount which would give him a reasonable return based on 
his actual investment; and 
 (iii) He cannot sell the property for a price which would not be confiscatory based upon his actual 
investment; and 
(iv) The property is not suitable for adaptive reuse; and 
 (v) His inability to use, rent, sell, or reuse the property is not the result of his own fault, for 
example, because through his own failure of maintenance the property has declined in value or 
become uninhabitable. Id. at 6-7. 
Although these are useful criteria, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Maker is not binding precedent in the 
District of Columbia. 
16 Id. 7. 
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Determining the constitutional validity of a land use regulation under the Takings 
Clause involves what is essentially a two-tiered inquiry. First, a court must determine 
whether the operation of the regulation deprives an owner of "all economically viable use" 
of his or her property. If this question is answered in the affirmative, the regulation effects 
aperse taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.1 If, however, the property 
retains any value whatsoever, the court must evaluate the regulation under the three-part 
test articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.18  Under Penn 
Central, courts engage in "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" that examine: 1) the 
economic impact of the regulation; 2) the regulation's interference with distinct, investment-
backed expectations; and 3) the nature of the governmental action.19  While courts 
occasionally engage in a full Penn Central analysis when hearing takings challenges to land 
use regulations, challenges to permit denials under historic preservation schemes are often 
subjected to a truncated version of test, which simply asks whether the regulation has 
denied the owner "all economically beneficial use" of the burdened property.20  Because 
most historic preservation laws allow owners to continue using protected properties in their 
current condition, the denial of a demolition permit will almost never fail under this 
standard. In fact, in the twenty-five years since Penn Central was decided, there have been 
only three reported cases in which restrictions 
17 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
18 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., 900 G Street Associates v. Dept. of Housing and Community Development, 430 A.2d 1387 (D.C. 
1981). See also RICHARD MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 314-15 (1999) ("[State courts], while giving lip service to the three-factor Penn Central 
test, often require complete elimination of economic use for a taking—which Penn Central does not."). 
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imposed under an historic preservation ordinance were held to violate the Takings 
Clause.21
Regulatory Takings vs. Unreasonable Economic Hardship 
The distinction between a violation of the Takings Clause and an unreasonable 
economic hardship under the DC Act is significant for a number of reasons. First, a 
property owner who wants to challenge the denial of a demolition permit on grounds of 
unreasonable economic hardship must seek judicial review of the Mayor's Agent's decision 
in the DC Court of Appeals.22  The plaintiff can argue that the finding of no unreasonable 
economic hardship was arbitrary and capricious, not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record, or on any of the other grounds for reversal described in the DC Administrative 
Procedure Act.23  A regulatory takings challenge to a permit denial, on the other hand, is 
properly filed as an original action in the DC Superior Court or in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia. Such actions are most commonly filed under 42 U.S.C. 
§1983. 
21 Keeler v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996); United Artists' Theater 
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991), rev'd, 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993); Broadview 
Apartments Co. v. Commission for Historical and Architectural Preservation, 433 A.2d 1214 (Md. Ct. Spec.. 
App. 1981). See generally J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings Challenges to Historic Preservation Laws 
After Penn Central (manuscript on file with author). 
22 DC Administrative Procedure Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1510(a) (2003) ("Any person suffering a legal 
wrong, or adversely affected or aggrieved, by an order or decision of the Mayor or an agency in a contested 
case, is entitled to a judicial review thereof in accordance with this subchapter upon filing in the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals a written petition for review."). 
23 Id. at § l-1510(a)(3). The DC Court of Appeals may set aside any action or findings and conclusions found 
to be: 
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations short of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority or limitations or short of statutory rights; 
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law, including any applicable procedure 
provided by this subchapter; or 
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in the record of the proceeding before the Court. Id. 
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Second, the proper remedy for a successful appeal of a Mayor's Agent's decision on 
economic hardship grounds is reversal of the decision and issuance of the original permit. 
The DC Court of Appeals does not have the authority to award compensation as a 
remedy.24  The proper remedy for a successful takings challenge to a permit denial, on the 
other hand, is just compensation for the property "taken."25  The district court cannot direct 
the Mayor's Agent to issue a demolition permit that had previously been denied. Such relief 
is only available in the DC Court of Appeals. At first glance, this distinction seems to offer 
the plaintiff a choice between obtaining compensation for the property taken and forcing 
issuance of the demolition permit. If a plaintiff seeks compensation, she should file an 
original action in the district court; if she prefers the issuance of a permit, then a petition for 
review in the DC Court of Appeals is the appropriate procedural route. A close reading of 
the DC Act, however, reveals that such a choice is illusory. The Act provides that no 
"permit shall be issued unless the Mayor finds that issuance of the permit is necessary in 
the public interest, or that failure to issue a permit will result in unreasonable economic 
hardship to the owner."26  While this provision prohibits the issuance of a permit when both 
of these conditions are absent, it by no means requires issuance when they are present. The 
Mayor's Agent may refuse to issue a permit even after determining that doing so would 
result in an unreasonable economic 
24 See District Intown Properties Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia, 23 F. Supp.2d 30, 34 (1998) (DC 
Law "provides no mechanism for compensating a property owner if the Mayor's Agent declines to issue [a] 
permit despite 'unreasonable economic hardship.'"). 
25 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314-
15 (1987) ("This basic understanding of the Amendment makes clear that it is designed not to limit the 
governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of 
otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.").  
26 D.C. CODE ANN. §6-1104. 
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hardship.27  Although such a decision would require the government to pay compensation 
for the property taken, it demonstrates that no plaintiff can force the Mayor's Agent to issue 
a demolition permit when doing so would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. 
Finally, a petition for review of a demolition permit denial must be filed in the DC 
Court of Appeals within thirty days of the Mayor's Agent's decision.28  The statute of 
limitations on a takings claim, on the other hand, is six years. One important issue for 
litigation purposes is whether a plaintiff is required to file a petition for review in the DC 
Court of Appeals before filing a §1983 action in federal district court. In Williamson 
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, the Supreme Court held that a 
constitutional takings claim is not ripe for judicial review unless the plaintiff has: 1) 
received a final decision from the government entity charged with implementing the 
regulation; and 2) pursued compensation through state inverse condemnation proceedings.29 
According to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, a plaintiffs failure to file 
a petition for review in the DC Court of Appeals does not preclude a constitutional takings 
claim in federal court.30  The denial of a demolition permit is a "final decision" for purposes 
of satisfying Williamson County, and "District law does not provide a procedure to 
compensate plaintiffs for denial of their building permit applications."31
27 See District Intown Properties Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia, 23 F. Supp.2d 30 (D.C. 1998) 
(holding that "even if [a plaintiff] successfully demonstrated 'unreasonable economic hardship,' [the Act] 
would merely authorize, but not require, the Mayor's Agent to issue the permits over the objections of the 
Board."). 
28 RULES OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS 15(a)(2) (2004). 
29 Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
30 District Intown, 23 F. Supp.2d at 35. 
31 Id. 
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900 G Street Associates and District Intown Properties 
A brief examination of two cases helps illustrate the difference between a regulatory 
takings claim and an action for judicial review of a finding of no unreasonable economic 
hardship. In 900 G Street Associates v. Department of Housing and Community 
Development, a developer applied for a permit to demolish the Old Masonic Temple, an 
individually designated landmark, on grounds of unreasonable economic hardship.32 
Although the plaintiff had initially attempted to argue that the demolition was consistent 
with the purposes of the Act, this claim was subsequently withdrawn.33 The Mayor's Agent 
denied the permit application, holding that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the 
denial would preclude "any reasonable use of its property or return on its investment."34 
The plaintiff appealed the decision to the DC Court of Appeals, arguing that the permit 
denial amounted to a taking of private property without compensation.35  The plaintiff did 
not, however, seek compensation for an unconstitutional taking; it merely sought judicial 
review of the Mayor's Agent's denial of a permit application.36  Although the Court 
acknowledged that the value of the property had been greatly diminished by the permit 
denial, it nevertheless held that the plaintiff had failed to establish unreasonable economic 
hardship.37  The Court observed that: 
if there is a reasonable alternative economic use for the property after the 
imposition of the restriction on that property, there is no taking, and hence 
no unreasonable economic hardship to the owners, no matter how 
32 900 G Street Associates v. Dept. of Housing and Community Development, 430 A.2d 1387 (D.C. 1981). 
33 Decision and Order of the Mayor's Agent, HPA No. 79-310 (December 21, 1979). 
34 Id. at 11. 
35 900 G Street Associates, 430 A.2d at 1389. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.1390-92. 
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diminished the property may be in cash value and no matter if 'higher' or 
'more beneficial' uses of the property have been proscribed.38
The Court also noted that the applicant bears the burden of proving that there are no 
reasonable alternative economic uses for the property.39  The decision to deny the plaintiffs 
permit was based upon the Mayor's Agent's determination that the plaintiff had failed to 
satisfy that burden. The Court held that the record was "more than adequate to establish 
that the Mayor's Agent could have reasonably concluded that an alternative economic use 
for the Building exists."40
District Intown Properties, Ltd. v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer 
and Regulatory Affairs provides a good example of a constitutional challenge to a permit 
denial under the Takings Clause.41  District Intown Properties was the owner of Cathedral 
Mansions, a three-building Georgian revival-style apartment complex with a large lawn 
facing the National Zoo.42  Twenty-seven years after purchasing Cathedral Mansions, 
District Intown filed an application to subdivide the subject property into nine lots of 
record.43  The new property configuration consisted of one large lot underneath the existing 
structures and eight smaller lots carved out of the lawn.44  District Intown had subdivided 
the property with the intention of constructing a townhouse on each of the eight smaller lots 
and applied for building permits to construct these townhouses in December 1988.45 While 
the building permits were pending, an application was filed with the HPRB to designate the 
Cathedral Mansions property (including the lawn) as an 
38 Id. at 1390. 
39 Mat 1391. 
40 Id. at 1392. 
41 District Intown Properties Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874 (1999). 
42 Id. at 877. 
43 Id. 
44 Id.           10 
 historic landmark.46  The HPRB approved designation of Cathedral Mansions as an 
individual landmark on May 17, 1989.47  In July 1989, the HPRB issued a recommendation 
to deny the building permit applications.48  According to the Board, the proposed 
construction would be incompatible with the property's historic landmark status.49  In 
January 1992, District Intown once again applied for permits to construct townhouses on 
the eight vacant lots, and the HPRB again recommended denial of the permits.50  The 
Mayor's Agent adopted the Board's recommendation and further observed that District 
intown had failed to carry its burden on the issues of unreasonable economic hardship and 
special merit.51
On April 21, 1993, District intown filed a petition for review in the DC Court of 
Appeals.52 It argued that the Mayor's Agent had exceeded his jurisdiction in making 
findings of fact and entering conclusions of law with respect to unreasonable economic 
hardship.53  According to District intown, the only proper consideration in reviewing permit 
applications for new construction—as opposed to alteration or demolition—is whether the 
proposed construction would be incompatible with the character of the landmark.54  District 
intown did not request that the Court reverse the permit denial; it merely argued that those 
portions of the decision discussing economic hardship should be 




49 Id. at 878. 
"Id. 
51 Decision and Order of the Mayor's Agent, HPA No. 92-213-220 (March 8, 1993). 
52 District Intown Properties Ltd. v. DCRA, 680 A.2d 1373 (D.C. 1996). 
53 Id. at 1377. 
54Id. at 1378.          11 
vacated.55  Although it agreed that special merit and economic hardship were not 
permissible considerations in the Mayor's Agent's review of new construction permits, the 
Court dismissed the petition on justiciability grounds.56  District Intown had not, according 
to the Court, been "adversely affected or aggrieved," nor had it suffered a legal wrong.57 
This decision, however, was still a victory for District Intown. It had filed the petition for 
review in the DC Court of Appeals because it had been concerned that the Mayor's Agent's 
findings on the issue of economic hardship could have precluded a takings claim in another 
forum. The DC Court of Appeals dismissed this concern, holding that "findings and 
conclusions of the Mayor's Agent can have preclusive effect only if the Mayor's Agent 
acted within his statutory authority in issuing them."58   Because the Mayor's Agent had 
exceeded his statutory authority in discussing the issue of economic hardship, District 
Intown would not be estopped from raising a takings claim in federal court. 
On March 22,1996, District Intown filed a §1983 action in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia, alleging that the denial of its building permits had effected an 
unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation.59 It argued that the 
denial of the building permits had rendered the eight vacant lots economically valueless 
and thus worked a "total taking" under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.60  The 
district court first engaged in the task of defining the relevant parcel of 
55Id. at 1375. 
56 Id. at 1377-78. 
57 Id. at 1377. This is a threshold requirement for judicial review of an agency decision under the DC 
Administrative Procedure Act. See B.C. CODE ANN. § l-1510(a). 
58 Id. at 1378. 
59 District Intown Properties Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia, 23 F. Supp.2d 30 (D.C. 1998). 
60 Id. at 35. Although the plaintiff conceded that the apartment building continued to produce rental income 
and had a positive market value, it argued that each of the eight vacant lots was rendered valueless by the 
12 
the property interest alleged to be taken.61  Because the apartment complex and lawn had 
been operated as a single economic and functional entity for the duration of District 
Intown's ownership, the Court held that the relevant parcel was the entire Cathedral 
Mansions property.62  The eight vacant lots were not distinct parcels for purposes of the 
takings analysis, and the denial of construction permits did not result in a Lucas-style total 
taking. The proper framework for analysis, according to the Court, was the tripartite test 
articulated in Penn Central. The Court proceeded to apply the Penn Central test and 
determined that the denial of District Intown's permits had not effected a taking requiring 
compensation.63  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed 
the judgment of the district court, noting that "District Intown could not have had any 
reasonable investment-backed expectations of development given the background 
regulatory structure at the time of subdivision."64
These two cases illuminate some of the key differences between a constitutional 
takings claim and a petition for review of a demolition permit denial. The substantive 
standard applied by the courts will be the same in both cases, but the procedural and 
remedial differences discussed above can become very important in developing strategies 
for litigation. The analysis becomes a bit more complicated, however, when the plaintiff in 
an economic hardship case satisfies the criteria for low-income owner status under the DC 
Law. 
permit denial. Id. A land use regulation that deprives an owner of "all economically viable use" of the 
property effects a per se taking. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. 
61 District Intown, 23 F. Supp.2d at 35-37. 
62 Id. at 36. 
63 Id. at 37-39. 
64 District Intown, 198 F.3d at 877.        13 
THE LOW-INCOME OWNER PROVISION OF THE DC LAW 
For most property owners, a court's analysis of constitutional takings claims and 
economic hardship claims under the DC Law will be identical (although the remedy will be 
different). For "low-income owners," however, an unreasonable economic hardship is 
defined as "an onerous and excessive financial burden."65 This raises two initial questions 
of statutory construction: who qualifies as a "low-income owner," and what is an "onerous 
and excessive financial burden"? Fortunately, the DC Municipal Code provides a clear 
definition of "low-income owner" in the historic preservation context. The DCMR defines a 
"low-income owner" as: 
an owner who is an applicant when the application is for a building or site 
owned by him or her and used as his or her principal place of residence, 
and whose household income is eighty percent (80%) or less of the median 
household income for the Washington Metropolitan Area as established 
from time to time by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development.66
This definition limits the reach of the low-income owner provision to owner-occupied 
residential buildings owned by individuals who earn less than $44,000 per year.67  A more 
difficult question is exactly which kinds of financial burdens should be considered 
"onerous and excessive." To answer this question, one must examine the underlying 
purposes of the provision. 
It is clear that the low-income owner provision provides heightened statutory 
protection beyond that guaranteed under federal constitutional law. For most property 
owners, a permit can be issued only if the Mayor's Agent determines that denial will 
65 D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1102(14). 
66 10 D.C.M.R. § 2599.1 (2003).        
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render the property economically valueless. The costs of restoring a protected building are 
not given significant weight in this calculus if there is any economically viable use for the 
property. The "onerous and excessive financial burden" language, on the other hand, 
seems to imply that low-income individuals maybe entitled to a demolition permit if the 
costs of restoring the property exceed the owner's financial means. Such an interpretation 
would allow the Mayor's Agent to grant a demolition permit in cases in which the 
restoration of a protected property would be economically feasible but for the owner's low-
income status. 
The Original Purpose of the Low-Income Owner Provision 
An interpretation of the low-income owner provision that allows the demolition of 
buildings that are capable of earning a reasonable economic return goes far beyond what is 
generally considered to be the primary purpose of the economic hardship clause. If the 
economic hardship provision functions solely as an escape hatch to avoid takings liability, 
then the low-income provision doesn't make much sense. This tension suggests that the 
DC Council's inclusion of the low-income owner provision in the DC Act was motivated 
by other concerns. 
One likely objective of the low-income owner provision is the mitigation of the 
potential effects of gentrification caused by historic designation. During consideration of 
the bill that eventually became the DC Law, some Council members expressed concern that 
historic designation "would accelerate the displacement of poor persons from inner 
67 HUD's median family income for the Washington, DC metropolitan area is $55,000 for Fiscal Year 2004. 
See Estimated Median Family Incomes for FY 2004, available at 
http://www.huduser.org/Datasets/IL/IL04/HUD-Medians.pdf (last visited on 04/01/04).  
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city neighborhoods."68  The original version of the DC Law did not include a low-income 
owner provision.69 The provision was introduced in the Committee on Housing and Urban 
Development as an amendment in November 1978.70 The unanimous adoption of this 
amendment seemed to be informed by a belief that the very designation of an area as an 
historic district would result in gentrification and the displacement of low-income residents. 
The charge that gentrification results in the displacement of poor residents is 
certainly a valid concern. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is some relationship 
between increases in property values caused by gentrification and the subsequent 
displacement of low-income residents. It is also beyond dispute that the DC Council acted 
within its constitutional authority in creating a separate economic hardship standard for 
low-income individuals.71 However, empirical evidence gathered since the enactment of the 
DC Law suggests that there is no clear relationship between gentrification and the 
involuntary displacement of low-income residents.72  Even if one were to assume that 
gentrification does in fact cause displacement, it is not exactly clear how historic 
68 Jeremy W. Dutra, "You Can't Tear It Down": The Origins of the D.C. Historic Preservation Act, 
avai7a&/ea?http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/histpres/dc_hp_law.cfin?CFID=21713&CFTOKEN=33806655. 
69 See DC Bill 2-367 (1978). 
70 Amendment No. 2 to Bill 2-367 (November 14, 1978). 
71 The low-income owner provision almost certainly passes constitutional muster under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, legislative 
classifications that do not burden a suspect class or implicate a fundamental right will be upheld if they are 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. See New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 
U.S. 568 (1979). Wealth (or lack thereof) is not a suspect class. San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Protecting the District's low-income residents against displacement is certainly 
a legitimate public purpose, and the low-income ownership provision is rationally related to that purpose. 
72 See Lance Freeman & Frank Braconi, Gentrification and Displacement, 8 THE URBAN PROSPECT 1 (2002), 
available at http://www.chpcny.org (noting that poor households are less likely to move from gentrifying 
neighborhoods than from non-gentrifying neighborhoods); Jacob L. Vigdor, Does Gentrification Harm the 
Poor?, 2002 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 133, available at 
http://muse.jhu.edU/journals/urb/toc/urb2002.l.html (corroborating Freeman and Braconi's findings). See 
16 
designation stimulates gentrification. Gentrification is a social phenomenon that has not 
been limited to historic districts. If there is a significant relationship between historic 
designation and gentrification, it is likely that the relationship is caused not by the permit 
review process, but by the substantial federal tax incentives that are available for 
rehabilitation of historic properties.73  Whether federal tax law or the permit review process 
causes gentrification is well beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the 
benefits of the low-income owner provision are uncertain at best. The costs, however, are 
substantial. 
Manipulation of the Low-Income Owner Provision 
The low-income owner provision of the DC Law creates the potential for two 
distinct types of abuse. First, individuals may employ creative accounting techniques to 
satisfy the provision's maximum income requirement. The DC Act does not expressly 
require the provision of personal income tax returns or other proof of income in economic 
hardship claims.74 The Mayor's Agent may, however, "require that an applicant furnish 
generally J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 How. L.J. 405 (2003) (discussing the empirical 
literature on gentrification and displacement). 
73 The Rehabilitation Investment Tax Credit (RITC) Program provides tax credits for the costs of 
rehabilitating historic structures. See 36 C.F.R. § 67 (2004). 
74 The DC Act provides that all economic hardship claimants must submit the following documentation to the 
Mayor's Agent: 
(A) For all property: 
(i)   The amount paid for the property, the date of purchase, and the party from whom 
purchased, including a description of the relationship, if any, between the owner and 
the person from whom the property was purchased;  
(ii) The assessed value of the land and improvements thereon according to the two most 
recent assessments; 
(iii) Real estate taxes for the previous two years;  
(iv) Annual debt service, if any, for the previous two years;  
(v) All appraisals obtained within the previous two years by the owner or applicant in 
connection with his purchase, financing, or ownership of the property;  
(vi) Any listing of the property for sale or rent, price asked, and offers received, if any; 
and 
(vii) Any consideration by the owner as to profitable adaptive use of the property; and 
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 such additional information as the Mayor believes is relevant to his determination of 
unreasonable economic hardship and may provide in appropriate instances that such 
additional information be furnished under seal."75  District regulations further provide that 
individuals claiming low-income status must provide "a statement of present household 
income and the number of persons in the household."76  The regulations do not discuss how 
household income should be calculated. Although wages would certainly be viewed as 
income, it is not clear if returns on investments or capital gains would count as well. The 
absence of a clear standard for determining household income creates a very real possibility 
of manipulation. For example, an affluent business owner could set her own income in a 
way that creates the appearance of low-income status, in addition, the narrow focus on 
household income would allow individuals with considerable assets but little nominal 
income to qualify for low-income owner status. It is doubtful that the DC Council had such 
individuals in mind when it drafted the low-income owner provision. 
Second, developers and other parties might use genuinely low-income individuals 
as straw parties to obtain demolition permits for protected properties. This tactic would 
involve a developer selling a protected property to a low-income individual at a very low 
price. The low-income owner would then apply for a permit to demolish the building on 
economic hardship grounds. After razing the building, the straw party would then sell the 
property back to the developer at a premium. Although the developer will still have to 
comply with the permit review process, it will now be applying for a new construction 
(B) For income-producing property: 
(i)   Annual gross income from the property for the previous two years; 
(ii) Itemized operating and maintenance expenses for the previous two years; 
(iii) Annual cash flow, if any, for the previous two years.  
D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1104(g)(l). 
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 permit rather than a demolition permit. As a result, the developer's proposed construction 
will enjoy a presumption of compatibility, and the burden of proving incompatibility will 
shift to the government.77  The developer will still have to demonstrate that the proposed 
construction is "not incompatible" with the character of the historic district. Nevertheless, 
this tactic would allow demolitions that would be clearly impermissible under the regular 
economic hardship provision. Section 6-1104 of the DC Act requires economic hardship 
applicants to provide "a description of the relationship, if any, between the owner and the 
person from whom the property was purchased." This provision suggests that the DC 
Council may have anticipated exactly this kind of manipulation. Unfortunately, few 
individuals acting as straw parties for developers are likely to disclose the true nature of 
their relationship with them. The effective prevention of the low-income owner provision's 
abuse will require safeguards other than those currently provided by the DC Act. 
Potential Solutions: Fix It or Dump It? 
The only completely effective way of preventing the types of abuse described above 
would be to repeal the low-income owner provision. This proposal is not as radical as it 
sounds, hi the twenty-five years that the Historic Landmark and Historic District 
Protection Act has been in place, the Mayor's Agent has never issued a demolition permit 
under the terms of the low-income owner provision. Those who would support keeping 
75 Id. at§6-1104(g)(2). 
7610 D.C.M.R. §2516.4(c). 
77 The permit review process for new construction provides that a building permit "shall be issued unless the 
Mayor, after due consideration of the zoning laws and regulations of the District of Columbia, finds that the 
design of the building and the character of the historic district or historic landmark are incompatible." D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 6-1107(f). Compare Id. at § 6-1104(e) ("No [demolition] permit shall be issued unless the 
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the provision in place will argue that this fact suggests that any concern with its abuse is 
overblown. It is clear, however, that the low-income owner provision creates the potential 
for manipulation. The fact that developers haven't yet taken advantage of this opportunity 
is an unpersuasive justification for keeping the provision in place. The provision's benefits 
to low-income individuals are de minimis at best; the costs of its potential abuse are 
tremendous. Unfortunately, no member of the DC Council is likely to propose repealing a 
legislative provision that was designed to protect low-income individuals against 
displacement. Given this political reality, other approaches to this problem must be 
developed. 
Preventing the first type of abuse—the use of misleading accounting techniques— 
would require, at a minimum, a more searching inquiry into the economic status of the 
applicant. First, the Mayor's Agent should consider—in addition to income received in the 
form of wages and investments—the value of an applicant's other assets. An individual 
who owns five cars and three houses shouldn't qualify for the low-income owner provision 
simply because he has a nominal annual income below $44,000. Second, the Mayor's 
Agent should not limit his inquiry to the applicant's "present household income." The 
Mayor's Agent should examine income streams over a period of at least three to five years. 
The current Mayor's Agent took a step in the right direction in the recent case of 
Will and Gennet Purcell.78   Purcell involved an application for the installation of 48 vinyl 
replacement windows on a corner house within the Greater U Street Historic District. 
Mayor finds that issuance of the permit is necessary in the public interest, or that failure to issue a permit 
will result in unreasonable economic hardship to the owner."). 
78 Decision and Order of the Mayor's Agent, HPA Nos. 01-202; 01-515 (March 12, 2004). 
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The Purcells sought an alteration permit after they had already replaced the original 
wooden windows. Both the HPRB and the Mayor's Agent determined that the installation 
of vinyl windows on the house was inconsistent with the purposes of the Act and 
incompatible with the character of the historic district.79  During a hearing before the 
Mayor's Agent, the plaintiffs argued that the denial of the alteration permit would impose 
an unreasonable economic hardship upon them. Although both plaintiffs were attorneys, 
they claimed to have a combined household income of only $8,000, which was well below 
the maximum income limit of the low-income owner provision.80  Gennet Purcell had 
recently been laid off from her position as an associate at a large law firm, and Will Purcell 
was self-employed. The house, which had been purchased for $135,000 in April 2000, was 
assessed at a value of $640,000 in 2002.81 The Mayor's Agent also examined the Purcells' 
other assets and liabilities, which included two cars, rental income from a basement 
apartment, bank account balances, and child support payments.82
The Mayor's Agent determined that the Purcells had failed to demonstrate 
unreasonable economic hardship. In so holding, he observed that "to the extent that 
Applicants are experiencing economic hardship, such circumstance is only temporary, due 
to Gennet Purcell's unemployment status, and Will Purcell's low cash flow as he seeks to 
build and expand his law practice."83  By setting up a distinction between "sustained" and 
"temporary" low-income owners, the Mayor's Agent has provided a useful check against 
the manipulation of the low-income owner provision. Because the 
79 Id. at 1. The Mayor's Agent entered a default judgment after the applicants failed to show up for the 
hearing on their permit application. The applicants later requested, and were granted, a rehearing on the issue 
of economic hardship. Id. 
80 Id. at 5. 
81 Id. at 3-4.          21 
Purcells had failed to satisfy the low-income owner criteria, their ability to sell the house at 
a gain precluded a finding of unreasonable economic hardship. While some applicants 
might argue that this detailed scrutiny of financial records is unreasonably intrusive, it is 
clear that the Mayor's Agent is authorized under the DC Law to require such 
documentation.84
It will be considerably more difficult to erect effective safeguards against the second 
kind of manipulation. As mentioned above, all economic hardship claimants must disclose 
"the relationship, if any, between the owner and the person from whom the property was 
purchased." It is clear, however, that a low-income owner who is acting as a straw party 
will have a strong economic disincentive to disclosing the nature of his relationship with 
the developer. Unless the Mayor's Agent allows the government to use polygraph tests and 
trial lawyers to impeach the testimony of economic hardship applicants, there would appear 
to be no way of distinguishing bona fide claimants from straw parties. 
One potential solution to this problem would be the use of conservation easements 
to ensure that any new construction on a property would be limited to the structure 
proposed by the low-income owner at the time the demolition permit application is filed. 
The term "conservation easement" is often used to describe restrictive covenants, negative 
easements, and equitable servitudes that are created for the purpose of protecting 
82 Id. at 5. 
83 Id. at 10. 
84 See B.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1104(g)(2) ("The Mayor may require that an applicant furnish such additional 
information as the Mayor believes is relevant to his determination of unreasonable economic hardship."). 
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 and managing historic, environmental, and other property resources.85    Although there are 
a number of important legal differences between these distinct property interests, they are 
functionally similar in that they each allow a private individual or group to obtain a 
protective non-possessory interest in the property of another. Governments often obtain 
protective easements as well. For example, District zoning regulations currently condition 
permits for planned unit developments (PUDs) on the recordation of a covenant between 
the property owner and its successors to use the property only in the manner specified.86 
Until recently, the effectiveness of conservation easements in the historic preservation 
context has been quite limited due to the common law requirements imposed on such 
restrictions. For example, if a land use restriction imposed by a restrictive covenant did not 
"touch and concern the land," the covenant would not bind successive owners of the 
burdened property. The District of Columbia Uniform Conservation Easement Act 
(UCEA) eliminated much of the uncertainty that often accompanies the use of negative 
easements and servitudes for preservation purposes by removing the common 
law requirements that often rendered them ineffective.    There are at least three problems, 
however, with the use of conservation easements for the protection of historic structures. 
 
First, although the UCEA addresses some of the common law limitations placed 
upon conservation easements, the Act expressly states that it "does not affect the power of a 
court to modify or terminate a conservation easement in accordance with principles of 
85 John Walliser, Conservation Servitudes, 13 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 47, 48-50 (1997). For a general 
discussion of the use of conservation easements in the historic preservation context, see Daniel McCall, The 
Role of Easements in Historic Preservation: Implications of Valuing a Property Right as a Commodity 
(2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
86 10 D.C.M.R. 2407.3 (2003).        23 
law and equity."88 There are two common law doctrines that allow courts to terminate 
servitudes in certain situations. Under the "relative hardship" doctrine, the owner of 
property that is burdened by a servitude can raise an affirmative defense that the 
individualized burden of the restriction outweighs its benefits to the land.89 The doctrine of 
"changed conditions" allows courts to refuse equitable enforcement of a servitude if 
the property restriction has become obsolete.90  Under either of these doctrines, courts are 
given an enormous amount of discretion to decide whether the costs of a servitude 
outweigh its benefits, or if a land use restriction has become "obsolete." The continuing 
viability of these doctrines in state courts undermines the effectiveness of easements and 
other servitudes as preservation instruments. 
Second, courts often construe servitudes very narrowly in order to avoid 
enforcement, hi Foundation for the Preservation of Historic Georgetown v. Arnold, the DC 
Court of Appeals narrowly construed a conservation easement to dismiss an enforcement 
action against a landowner.91 After observing that the terms of the easement were 
ambiguous, the Court held that an exterior alteration on the subject property did not violate 
the easement. In so holding, the Court opined that "restrictions on land use should be 
construed in favor of the free use of land and against the party seeking enforcement."92 It is 
unlikely that conservation easements will adequately protect historic resources when judges 
take this kind of an approach to their interpretation. 
87 DC CODE ANN. § 42-202 (2004). 
88 Id at § 42-203. 
89 See Edward E. Chase, Servitudes, 1 AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 605[6][a], at 6-123 (Arthur Gaudio ed. 
1994). 
90 Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common Law, 8 STAN. ENV. L.J. 2, 
39(1989). 
91 Foundation for the Preservation of Historic Georgetown v. Arnold, 651 A.2d 794 (D.C. 1994). 
92 Id. at 797.          24 
Finally, there is a potential constitutional problem with conditioning the approval of 
a building permit on the applicant's agreement to dedicate a conservation easement, in 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court held that a coastal 
management agency violated the Takings Clause when it conditioned the approval of a 
building permit on the plaintiffs agreement to dedicate a public easement across the dry-
sand portion of its private beach.93 The Court observed that "unless the permit condition 
[the exaction] serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building 
restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.'"94 
Although the Court did not prohibit the use of all development exactions, it did note that 
there must be an "essential nexus" between the exaction and the public purpose that the 
development ban is designed to achieve.95 in Dolan v. City of Tigard. the Supreme Court 
tightened the requirements of the Nollan test.96 in addition to demonstrating the existence of 
an "essential nexus," governments are now required to prove that the exaction is "roughly 
proportional" to the public purpose it is designed to achieve.97 The Court held that the 
governmental body must "make some sort of individualized determination that the required 
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."98
Although Nollan and Dolan generally limit the ability of governments to use 
exactions as land use planning devices, most conservation easements would have no 
trouble satisfying the tests articulated in those cases. There is certainly an "essential 
93 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
94 Id. at 837. 
95 Id. 
96 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
97 Id. at 391. 
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nexus" between the dedication of a conservation easement and the public purpose of 
protecting the historic building to which the easement is attached. Most easements will 
also be "roughly proportional" to the impact of the applicant's proposed construction. 
Indeed, it would be difficult to design an exaction that is more narrowly tailored to 
achieving the purpose of preservation than a conservation easement. Unless a conservation 
easement bore almost no relationship to the maintenance of the character of an historic 
district or landmark, the decisions in Nollan and Dolan do not appear to place any 
significant limitations on the use of conservation easements in the historic preservation 
context. 
Although conservation easements can be a useful adjunct to a robust preservation 
ordinance, the precarious nature of the protection that they provide makes them undesirable 
as a standalone system for protecting historic resources. However, the fact that 
conservation easements are not completely effective in preventing the demolition of 
historic buildings is no reason to entirely dismiss their usefulness. Such easements can be 
very effective in making the kinds of abuse described above much more difficult. 
CONCLUSION 
The low-income owner provision of the DC Law was designed to mitigate one of 
the perceived effects of historic designation: gentrification and the concomitant 
displacement of low-income residents. Unfortunately, the potential costs of the provision 
far exceed its likely benefits. Although the relationship between historic designation and 
the displacement of low-income residents is questionable, the repeal of the low-income 






income applicants and the use of conservation easements can help minimize the potential 
for abuse. 
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